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| Copyright © 2001 |
| C-Risk, Inc. |
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The Construction Defect Coverage Claim Under A CGL Policy:
Back To Basics
by Alan C. Eagle, Esq. & James V. Aiosa, Esq.
This paper was originally published in Emerging Insurance Disputes. All rights reserved,
Rivkin, Radler & Kremer, LLP.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, there have been countless lawsuits filed by
property owners against contractors, subcontractors and others who
have worked on construction projects (collectively,
"contractors") alleging damages arising from construction
defects. These contractors have often tendered such claims to their
insurers under commercial general liability f/k/a comprehensive
general liability ("CGL") policies in an attempt to obtain
insurance coverage for their construction defect liabilities. These
insurance claims have spawned much coverage litigation in which courts
have grappled with the question of whether construction defect claims
fall within a CGL policy. From this coverage litigation, there is an
emerging body of sometimes conflicting and very often confusing
construction defect insurance coverage law.
This article will cut through this law and get back to basics by
providing the general framework for analyzing a claim for insurance
coverage for construction defects under a CGL policy, including an
identification of the recurring coverage issues. As will be seen, the
unnecessarily confusing body of case law is developing for two primary
reasons. First and foremost, CGL policies were not designed to provide
coverage for most types of construction defect claims. One court
described the policy reasons as follows:
If insurance proceeds could be used to pay for the repairing and/or
replacing of poorly constructed products, a contractor or
subcontractor could receive initial payment for its work and then
receive subsequent payment from the insurance company to repair and
replace it. Equally repugnant on policy grounds is the notion that the
presence of insurance obviates the obligation to perform the job
initially in a workmanlike manner.1
Insureds' attempts to shoe-horn such claims into CGL policies that
were not designed to cover them have sometimes resulted in confusing,
result-oriented decisions.
Second, courts have grappled with the effects of the changes in the
"standard" CGL policy language in 1973 and 1986, as well as
the effect of various endorsements on construction defect coverage
claims.2 Because CGL policies generally are "triggered" by
property damage during the policy period, contractors typically tender
their construction defect claims under their CGL policies dating from
when the construction took place through manifestation of the damage.
Accordingly, such claims have been and will continue to be made under
multiple policy years with varying insurance contract language. This,
too, has created a body of decisional authority that is less than a
model of clarity.
While every construction defect coverage claim must be resolved based
upon the particular insurance contracts and facts at issue, the
general framework for the analysis is the same as any coverage
analysis under a CGL policy. Assuming the insured has met the
conditions precedent to coverage such as timely notice, the first
question is whether the claim falls within the coverage grant of the
policy. If so, the question then becomes whether one or more
exclusions in the policy operate to preclude coverage. When this
analysis is performed under a typical CGL policy, it yields a number
of potential coverage defenses.
While this article does not purport to exhaustively address every
coverage issue that arises with respect to construction defect claims,
it will identify a number of coverage defenses that have frequently
arisen with respect to such claims. In light of the nature of the
typical construction defect claim and the design of the CGL policy,
there are a number of potential reasons that such a claim may fall
outside the scope of CGL coverage or may be otherwise excluded.
II. DOES THE CONSTRUCTION DEFECT CLAIM FALL WITHIN THE COVERAGE
GRANT OF THE CGL POLICY?
Coverage under a CGL policy is generally limited to claims against the
insured for "property damage" resulting from an
"occurrence." In turn, "property damage" is
generally defined as "[p]hysical injury to tangible property . .
. or . . . [l]oss of use of tangible property that is not physically
injured." Moreover, coverage under a CGL policy is generally not
"triggered" unless the property damage results "during
the policy period." An "occurrence" is generally
defined as an "accident, including continuous or repeated
exposure to conditions, which results in bodily injury or property
damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the
insured."3
Accordingly, a construction defect claim does not fall within the
coverage of a typical CGL policy unless, at a minimum, it involves the
following:
- "Property damage" as defined in the
policy"
- "Property damage" resulting
"during the policy period;" and
- An "accident" resulting in property
damage "neither expected nor intended" by the insured.
Depending upon the nature of the construction defect claim, it may
fall outside the scope of coverage for one or more of these reasons.
A. The Property Damage Requirement
One issue that frequently arises with construction defect coverage
claims is whether the claim involves "physical injury to or
destruction of tangible property" within the definition of
"property damage."4 Because the injury to or destruction of
tangible property must be "physical," claims for intangible
injury do not fall within this definition.5
As such, , where the construction claim against the insured,
contractor does not involve tangible, physical injury, courts have
found no covered "property damage."6 Such situations arise
where, for example, the claims against the contractor are limited to
misrepresentation, breach of contract or indemnity without tangible,
physical injury to property.
Courts have also held that claims limited to fixing or replacing all
or part of defective construction and/or claims of diminution in value
because of defective construction work or materials with no physical
injury are not claims for "property damage."7 Defective work
or materials in and of itself does not constitute "property
damage."
As explained by one court:
Generally liability policies, such as the ones in dispute here, are
not designed to provide contractors and developers with coverage
against claims their work is inferior or defective. The risk of
replacing and repairing defective materials or poor workmanship has
generally been considered a commercial risk which is not passed on to
the liability insurer. Rather, liability coverage comes into play when
the insured's defective materials or work cause injury to property
other than the insured's own work or products.
. . . [W]e do not believe inferior materials or workmanship themselves
constitute "property damage." We concede it is possible for
a manufacturer or contractor to use inferior materials or methods
without causing any property damage . . . . However, where the defect
in fact has caused either physical injury to or the lost use of
tangible property, liability coverage has been found.8
Applying these principles, another court held that there was no
covered "property damage" where the insured supplied and
installed defective molds in a cement block manufacturing plant. The
molds were used to manufacture interlocking concrete blocks. The
manufacturer subsequently received complaints from some of its
purchasers that blocks were not properly sized, and the manufacturer
reimbursed one such customer for economic losses suffered by the
customer through increased labor costs associated with cutting the
blocks to make them fit properly. The manufacturer sued the insured
for these losses and damages for loss of anticipated profits from
unused blocks and loss in business reputation. The court held that
there was no coverage because the manufacturer's suit against the
insured did not involve "property damage" within the meaning
of the policy, reasoning as follows:
The inclusion of the word "physical" in this policy was
designed to preclude recovery for consequential or intangible damages
such as diminution or depreciation in value.
. . . .
The CGL policy was not intended to protect the insured against
contractual liability for defective goods (i.e., the molds and liners
used to form the blocks), workmanship or design . . . ."9
Likewise, in another case, the court held that the insured, building
contractor's incorporation of defective workmanship and materials into
a home that it constructed did not constitute covered "property
damage." While "the defective materials and workmanship
concededly produced an inferior home," the court held that this
is not "property damage" within the meaning of the CGL
policy.10
As illustrated by these cases, the very nature of many construction
defect claims lend themselves to close scrutiny as to whether they
involve "property damage" as defined in the CGL policy. If
not, the claim is not covered.
B. Property Damage During the Policy Period
There is no coverage under a CGL policy unless the property damage
results "during the policy period." Courts, therefore, have
agreed that resulting property damage, not the preceding negligent or
causative act, "triggers" coverage under a CGL policy.11
Courts have had a more difficult time agreeing when "property
damage" occurs for purposes of triggering coverage where
"long-tail" claims involving multiple years are involved.
While this issue has been most frequently litigated in the context of
environmental and asbestos claims, it also arises in the context of
construction defect claims because there is often a question of
whether the property damage occurred when the construction took place,
when the property damage manifested, or sometime in between.
In resolving when property damage occurs for purposes of triggering
coverage for such long-tail claims, courts throughout the country have
not been consistent. However, the approaches they have taken may be
categorized into four general "trigger" theories, as
follows:
- The "Exposure" Theory. Courts
in certain jurisdictions have opined that property damage occurs
upon exposure and have therefore triggered the policy or policies
in effect upon exposure to the damaging condition.12
- The "Damage-in-Fact" Theory.
Other courts have triggered the policy or policies on the risk
when the injury or damage, in fact, occurs. This is also referred
to as the "actual" injury or damage theory.13
- The "Manifestation" Theory.
Courts adopting a "manifestation" trigger have held that
the only policy that must respond is the one in effect when the
damage is discovered or manifests.14
- The "Continuous" Trigger
Theory. Still other courts have used a "continuous"
trigger, holding that all policies on the risk from
"exposure" through "manifestation" are
triggered.15
Courts have applied these trigger theories in the context of
construction defect claims yielding different results, depending upon
the particular jurisdiction's trigger law and the particular factual
scenarios at issue. For example, in Maryland Casualty Co. v. W. R.
Grace & Co.,16 the Second Circuit, interpreting New York law,
applied a "damage-in-fact" trigger to claims involving the
installation of asbestos products which needed to be removed. The
court held that "damage-in-fact," or actual damage, occurred
upon installation, triggering only those policies in effect at the
time of installation. In so doing, the court rejected
"manifestation" and "continuous" trigger theories
under the circumstances.
In Korossy v. Sunrise Homes, Inc.,17 however, the Louisiana court held
that a "manifestation" or "first discovery"
trigger was appropriate. There, various homeowners sued a developer
for construction defects resulting in excessive settlement in the
foundations of their homes. The court held that the coverage in place
when the homeowners first discovered the damage was triggered.
Thus, in resolving whether coverage exists for a construction defect
claim, the particular jurisdiction's trigger law must be considered in
resolving whether property damage resulted during the policy period as
is necessary to trigger coverage. The particular jurisdiction's law to
be applied and unique factual circumstances may make the difference as
to whether the claim is covered.
C. The "Occurrence" Requirement
There is no coverage under a CGL policy without an
"occurrence," which is generally defined as an accident
resulting in property damage "neither expected nor intended"
by the insured. If the insured, contractor reasonably should have
expected or intended the property damage, there is no coverage. Stated
differently, CGL policies cover only fortuitous events.
The "occurrence" issue is necessarily dependent upon the
particular facts and circumstances of a construction defect claim.
Where the facts demonstrate that there was no accident or that the
insured should have reasonably expected damage, courts have found that
coverage is precluded.18
For example, in one case, the insured, contractor performed brick and
masonry work on a new office building, but the building owner refused
to pay for the allegedly unworkman-like work..19 The Minnesota Supreme
Court held that there was no "occurrence" because the
property damage, which resulted from obvious violations of contract
standards of workmanship, was expected.20
Similarly, the Appellate Court of Illinois held that the natural
results of the negligent and unworkman-like construction of a building
do not constitute an "occurrence" within the meaning of the
CGL policy.21 The court explained that "the cracks in the floor
and the loose paint on the exterior of the building are the natural
and ordinary consequences of installing defective concrete flooring
and applying the wrong type of paint."22
Hence, the facts of any construction defect claim should be examined
to determine whether the insured, contractor reasonably expected
damage from its conduct. If so, there is no "occurrence" and
no coverage.23
III. DOES AN EXCLUSION PRECLUDE COVERAGE FOR THE CONSTRUCTION
DEFECT CLAIM?
Even where the insured, contractor has fulfilled the conditions
precedent to coverage and the construction defect claim falls within
the coverage grant of the policy, an exclusion may operate to bar
coverage. Discussed below are the exclusions that most frequently
arise in the context of construction defect coverage claims.
A. Completed Operations Exclusion
In evaluating a construction defect coverage claim, it is important to
determine whether the CGL policy provides coverage for claims falling
within the "completed operations hazard." The completed
operations hazard generally includes property damage that occurs
"away from premises" owned by or rented to the named insured
after the insured's work has been "completed or
abandoned."24 Where the contractor purchases CGL coverage
including coverage for claims falling within the completed operations
hazard, such coverage is generally provided subject to the other
terms, conditions and exclusions in the policy, including those
discussed in this article. Where the contractor does not purchase such
coverage or such coverage is specifically excluded, this becomes a
significant defense to many construction defect coverage claims.
Indeed, while the particular contract language needs to be applied to
the particular claim, where completed operations hazard coverage is
excluded, this generally means that there is no coverage for property
damage that occurs away from the insured, contractor's premises after
the contractor's work is completed.25 For example, in State Farm and
Casualty Company v. Avant,26 coverage was sought under a brick mason's
CGL policy that specifically excluded property damage included within
the completed operations hazard which included property damage that
"occurs after . . . operations have been completed or abandoned
and occurs away from premises owned by or rented to the named
insured." The brick mason built a defective fireplace in a new
home, which resulted in fire damage after the brick mason completed
his work. The Louisiana appellate court held that the "property
damage which was sustained after completion of the work . . . falls
squarely within the definition of the exclusionary completed
operations hazard clause, and coverage is excluded."27 The court
explained as follows:
The coverages provided by [the contractor's] policy were designed to
cover [the contractor's] liability for losses which occur during the
actual period of construction. Where completed operations and products
hazards are excluded from coverage as they were in [the contractor's]
policy, losses which occur subsequent to completion of the
construction are not covered.28
Where the property damage at issue occurs after completion of the
contractor's work, therefore, the question of whether the contractor's
policy covers completed operations is a critical part of the coverage
analysis.
B. Business Risk Exclusions
There are several exclusions in the CGL policy that courts have
generally referred to collectively as the "business risk"
exclusions. Individually, they are commonly known as the
"insured's products," the "work performed" and the
"faulty workmanship" exclusions. They have been referred to
as "business risk" exclusions because they exclude coverage
for various types of risks that are generally thought of as risks of
doing business.
1. The Insured's Products Exclusion
Pre-1986 CGL policies generally exclude coverage for "property
damage to the named insured's products arising out of such products or
any part of such products." Along these same lines, the 1986 CGL
form excludes coverage for "'[p]roperty damage' to 'your product'
arising out of it or any part of it[,]" but the definition of
"your product" does not include "real property."29
A significant issue that has arisen with respect to this exclusion is
whether a general contractor's completed construction project is the
general contractor's "product," thereby precluding coverage
to the general contractor for property damage to such construction
project arising out of such project, or any part of such project.
While there is a line of cases holding that a completed construction
project is considered the general contractor's product for purposes of
the insured's products exclusion,30 there is also a line of cases
holding that it is not to be considered as such.31
For example, one New York appellate court addressed the question of
whether a general contractor was covered for claims against it arising
from the construction of, among other things, a school building.32 The
underlying claimant alleged that the roof constructed by the insured's
sub-contractor leaked, causing damage to the roof and the school
building. Stressing that "it can hardly be contended here that
the parties intended these liability policies to operate as
performance bonds for the work performed by [the insured] or his
subcontractors," the court held that the claims come within the
insured's products exclusion because the school building was the
insured's "product."33 In support of its holding, the court
pointed out that Webster's Dictionary defines "product" as
"something produced by physical labor or intellectual
effort," which would include a general contractor's building
project.34
One California appellate court disagreed with such reasoning in a case
arising from claims against insured, general contractors alleging that
condominiums they built were damaged by soil subsidence.35 The insurer
argued that the insured's products exclusion barred coverage because
the entire condominium project was its insured's product, but the
court disagreed. Acknowledging that the insurer's interpretation is
supported by a number of jurisdictions outside California, the court
found that California decisions support the holding that the
construction of the condominium project was a "service" not
covered by the exclusion. The court further explained that "the
distinction arises and coverage exists when services, as opposed to
discrete, tangible components, have caused injury."36
In light of the above, the particular jurisdiction's law to be applied
may make a difference in resolving the question of whether the
insured's products exclusion operates to bar coverage.. Work Performed
Exclusion
Another so-called "business risk exclusion" is the work
performed exclusion. Under the 1973 CGL form, this exclusion bars
coverage for "property damage to work performed by or on behalf
of the named insured arising out of the work or any portion thereof,
or out of materials, parts or equipment furnished in connection
therewith." By its plain terms, therefore, this exclusion
precludes coverage for claims against contractors alleging defective
workmanship by the contractor without damage to work or property of
others.37
This exclusion has been applied to deny coverage to contractors for
claims arising from a wide array of allegedly defective construction
work, such as defective water supplies,38 defective stucco,39 a
defective retaining wall,40 and defective insulating panels.41 Indeed,
the New York Court of Appeals very recently described the breadth of
the work performed exclusion, especially when read in conjunction with
the insured's products exclusion, as follows:
The insurance policy contains an exclusion for "property damage *
* * arising out of [the insured's] products" or out of the
"work performed by or on behalf of the named insured." That
exclusion, commonly termed a "work product" exclusion,
exists to exclude coverage for business risks, including claims that
the insured's "product or completed work [was] not that for which
the damaged person bargained."
The "work product" of a residential land developer such as
plaintiff includes not only the mortar, bricks, wiring and pipes that
comprise its houses, but also the numerous discretionary choices that
must be made in the course of erecting those houses. The builder's
site choice, a choice that necessarily includes consideration of its
access to a water supply, is clearly part of that work product.
Thus, under the terms of plaintiff's insurance policy, liability
arising from siting this development so as to be dependent upon a
contaminated water supply is excluded from coverage.42
Significantly, the work performed exclusion in the 1973 CGL policy
specifically applies not only to property damage to work performed by
the insured, but also to property damage to work performed "on
behalf of" the insured. As such, courts have held that this
exclusion clearly precludes coverage for claims against general
contractors arising from the defective workmanship of their
subcontractors.43
For example, in one case, a general contractor for a condominium
project was sued for both damage to the condominium units resulting
from the collapse of a retaining wall which was installed by
subcontractors and damage to the retaining wall.44 The court held that
the work performed exclusion precludes coverage, stating that it
"not only applies to the insured's defective work but also
applies to the insured's satisfactory work that is damaged by the work
[of its subcontractor] that fails." The court noted that its
holding was consistent with the "purpose" of such polices,
as follows:
"The risk intended to be insured is the possibility that the . .
. work of the insured, once relinquished or completed, will cause
bodily injury or damage to property other than to the product or
completed work itself . . . ." The policy is neither a
performance bond nor "all risk" policy. Rather, the effect
of the policy is to make the contractor stand its own replacement and
repair losses while the insurer takes the risk of injury to the
property of others.45
The 1986 CGL form deleted the words "on behalf of" within
the work performed exclusion making clear that it will no longer
generally apply to the work of the insured's subcontractor.
Specifically, the 1986 exclusion precludes coverage for
"'property damage' to 'your work'46 arising out of it or any part
of it and included in the 'products-competed operations
hazard.'"47 This exclusion further provides, however, that it
"does not apply if the damaged work or the work out of which the
damage arises was performed on your behalf by a subcontractor."48
While the 1986 CGL form somewhat narrows the scope of the insured's
products and work performed exclusions found in the 1973 CGL form, it
expands the scope of the exclusions for "business risks" by
adding the so-called "faulty workmanship" exclusions. As
discussed below, the 1986 form largely puts back in what it takes out
of the 1973 form and sometimes excludes more, depending upon the
particular circumstances.
3. Faulty Workmanship Exclusions in 1986 Policy
Although the insured's products exclusion in the 1986 CGL form carves
out an exception for damage to "real property," and the work
performed exclusion in the 1986 form is limited to claims falling
within the products-completed operations hazard, the 1986 CGL form
goes on to add a number of construction-related exclusions that are
sometimes referred to as the "faulty workmanship"
exclusions. These exclusions clearly apply to "real
property" and include ongoing operations. Specifically, exclusion
"j" of the 1986 form precludes coverage for property damage
to:
(5) That particular part of real property on which you or any
contractors or subcontractors working directly or indirectly on your
behalf are performing operations, if the "property damage"
arises out of those operations; or
(6) That particular part of any property that must be restored,
repaired or replaced because "your work" was incorrectly
performed on it.
. . . .
Paragraph (6) of this exclusion does not apply to property damage
included in the "products-completed operations hazard." 49
Generally speaking, therefore, the "faulty workmanship"
exclusions preclude coverage for property damage to the real property
on which the contractor or its subcontractor is performing operations,
or the particular part of any property requiring restoration, repair
or replacement because the work of the contractor or its subcontractor
was incorrectly performed on it. Subsection "5" specifically
applies to "subcontractors," and subsection "6" so
applies through its reference to "your work" which is
defined as including work "performed by you or on your behalf
."
While there are not many cases dealing with these faulty workmanship
exclusions, the Court of Appeals of Texas addressed the exclusions in
a case involving the negligent application of linseed oil to wooden
doors and door frames of a building, causing discoloration.50 The
court held that both subsections "5" and "6"
precluded coverage. The court opined that subsection "5"
applied because the damage was to "that particular part of real
property on which" the insured is "performing
operations," and the damage "ar[ose] out of those
operations." Inasmuch as the insured had not yet completed its
service contract with the underlying claimant, the court rejected the
insured's argument that the damage did not arise out of
"performing operations." The court also rejected the
insured's argument that the doors and door frames were not "real
property" within the meaning of subsection "5" because
they were "annexed to realty as to become part of the
realty."51 The court found that subsection "6" applied
because such provisions "exclude coverage for damage to the
insured's work or product, as a result of faulty workmanship."52
The court explained that the "completed operations hazard"
exception did not apply because the insured had an "ongoing
service contract with the underlying claimant such that the insured's
'work' was not complete at the time of the damage."53
A California appellate court examined the faulty workmanship
exclusions in connection with a claim arising from the insured's
supplying of defective siding for houses which resulted in loss of
value of the houses.54 The court held that the exclusions were
inapplicable because they "differentiated between damage to the
product of the insured, and damage to other property caused by that
product."55 The court further explained that, as the supplier of
the siding, the exclusion would have operated to preclude coverage for
damage to the siding, but it did not apply to damage to the houses,
inasmuch as the insured did not perform any faulty workmanship on the
houses. The court noted that the exclusion would have applied if the
insured "had itself performed work on the houses, or if such work
was done on its behalf."56
The faulty workmanship exclusions in the 1986 policy are, therefore,
yet additional exclusions with potential applicability to construction
defect coverage claims.57
C. Contract Liability Exclusion
Both the 1973 and 1986 CGL forms also contain an exclusion known as
the "contract liability" or "contractual
liability" exclusion which also has potential applicability to
construction defect claims. This exclusion generally precludes
coverage for contractually assumed liability by the insured,
contractor, with certain exceptions as set forth in the exclusion
itself and as elaborated upon in the "Definitions" section
of the policy.
Specifically, the contract exclusion in the 1973 form precludes
coverage for "liability assumed by the insured under any contract
or agreement except an incidental contract; but this exclusion does
not apply to a warranty of fitness or quality of the named insured's
products or a warranty that work performed by or on behalf of the
named insured will be done in a workmanlike manner." The 1973
form contains an exception for liabilities assumed by the insured
under "incidental contracts," but the definition of
"incidental contracts" does not include the typical
construction contract, whereby the contractor agrees to indemnify the
owner for liabilities to third-parties arising from the contractor's
work, or the subcontractor agrees to indemnify the general contractor
for liabilities to third-parties arising from the subcontractor's
work.58 Accordingly, under the 1973 form, the contract liability
exclusion generally precludes coverage for liabilities assumed by the
insured under such an indemnity agreement.59
To partially fill the gap in coverage under the 1973 CGL form for
liabilities assumed under construction indemnity agreements, some
contractors paid additional premiums for endorsements covering
"designated contracts" or the endorsement known as the
"broad form" endorsement, which extended coverage for
liability assumed by the insured under a wider array of business
contracts.60 The contract liability exclusion contained in the 1986
policy form merged, in part, the contractual liability exclusion found
in the 1973 CGL form with the expanded coverage made available by the
broad form endorsement.
Specifically, the 1986 CGL form precludes coverage for "'bodily
injury' or 'property damage' for which the insured is obligated to pay
damages by reason of the assumption of liability in a contract or
agreement." Pursuant to its terms, however, "[t]his
exclusion does not apply to liability for damages: . . . (1) [a]ssumed
in . . . an 'insured contract;' or [t]hat the insured would have in
the absence of the contract." Significantly, "insured
contract" includes "[t]hat part of any other contract or
agreement pertaining to your business under which you assume the tort
liability of another to pay damages because of 'bodily injury' or
'property damage 'to a third person or organization, if the contract
or agreement is made prior to the 'bodily injury' or 'property
damage,'" and "tort liability means a liability that would
be imposed by law in the absence of any contract or agreement."61
By virtue of this exception in the 1986 contract exclusion, therefore,
the exclusion does not generally preclude coverage where the insured,
in a business contract, "assume[s] the tort liability of another
to pay damages because of 'bodily injury' or 'property damage'"
to another. Such an assumption of liability may be included in certain
construction indemnification agreements.
Because the contract exclusion's exception applies only to the
assumption of tort liability, one issue that has arisen is whether the
contractually assumed liability for which the insured seeks coverage
sounds in tort or in contract.62 When confronted with this issue,
certain courts have attempted to determine the nature of the
"liability underlying the [damages] award."63
For example, in Bernstein v. Consolidated American Insurance Co.,64 a
general contractor sued and recovered against the issuer of a
performance bond for a violation of the bond's conditions. The issuer
of the bond, in turn, brought suit against a subcontractor, seeking
reimbursement for the monies it paid pursuant to the bond, on the
basis of an indemnity agreement whereby the subcontractor agreed to
indemnify the issuer of the bond. The subcontractor then brought suit
against its insurer seeking reimbursement of any damages, but the
court held that the contract exclusion precluded coverage. The court
rejected the insured, subcontractor's argument that the contract
exclusion was inapplicable because the general contractor, in essence,
sought tort damages from the bond issuer. The court explained that the
"relevant inquiry is not the nature of the damages" sought
by the general contractor.65 "Rather, the question is on what
basis does the [general contractor] claim a right to recover from [the
bond issuer]?"66 The court found that the "sole premise for
[the bond issuer's] liability to [the general contractor] was the
performance bond, a contractual obligation," not tort
liability.67 That is to say, "but for [the bond issuer's]
contractual agreement to be liable to [the general contractor] under
the conditions set forth in the performance bond, [the general
contractor] would have no cause of action against [the bond
issuer]."68
While 1986 modifications to the 1973 CGL form have reduced the
applicability of the contract exclusion to certain types of liability
assumed in construction contracts, it may still apply to preclude
coverage under certain circumstances.
D. Sistership Exclusion
Another exclusion found in both the 1973 and 1986 CGL forms is the
so-called "sistership" exclusion. The sistership exclusion
found in the 1973 CGL policy form precludes coverage for: damages
claimed for the withdrawal, inspection, repair, replacement, or loss
of use of the named insured's products or work completed by or for the
named insured or of any property of which such products or work form a
part, if such products, work or property are withdrawn from the market
or from use because of any known or suspected defect or deficiency
therein . . . .
Although this exclusion is sometimes raised in the context of
construction defect coverage claims, including when insured, suppliers
are sued because of defective construction materials, courts have not
been particularly receptive to the application of the exclusion in
this context.69 Certain courts have limited the application of the
sistership exclusion to damages arising from the insured's recall or
withdrawal of products or materials from the marketplace which have
not yet caused damage, but which the insured anticipates may cause
damage in the future.70 Such courts have opined that when a third
party incurs costs to remove the insured's product from the market
(and to replace it with a comparable product), the sistership
exclusion does not apply.71 They have also concluded that the
sistership exclusion does not exclude coverage for damage sustained as
a result of a product which has already malfunctioned.72
These principles were relied upon by a court to find coverage, despite
the existence of a sistership exclusion, where a third party withdrew
the defective products after they malfunctioned.73 The insured in that
case manufactured wood panels which it sold to a "concrete
form" manufacturer which incorporated the panels into its forms.
The concrete form manufacturer subsequently sold its forms to a number
of contractors. The contractors began to complain to the forms
manufacturer that the forms were warping and the manufacturer recalled
the defective forms and offered to replace them with a similar product
made with wood obtained from another supplier. Both the forms
manufacturer and the contractors sued the manufacturer of the
defective wood panels, seeking reimbursement for, amongst other
things, the costs incurred to replace the defective forms. The court
rejected the insurer's argument that the sistership exclusion applied,
reasoning as follows:
First, no defective "sister" panels were withdrawn from the
market because of anyone's fears that they, too, would prove defective
after the defects first came to light. Panels were withdrawn and
replaced only after customers complained of defects in the panels
delivered to them. Second, it was third parties - [the forms
manufacturer and the contractors] - who withdrew the products, not the
insured party . . . . 74
The 1986 sistership exclusion is similar to the 1973 exclusion, but it
specifically applies to withdrawals or recalls by "any
person," making clear that the withdrawal or recall need not be
undertaken by the insured.75 Although there are very few reported
cases dealing with the 1986 exclusion, it may apply under appropriate
circumstances to construction defect coverage claims.
E. Owned or Leased Property Exclusion
CGL policies provide coverage for third-party, not first party,
liability. As such, property damage to the insured's property or
property over which the insured exercised care, custody or control is
not covered. These fundamental principles are effectuated through the
so-called "owned or leased property," "care, custody or
control" and "alienated premises" exclusions in the
1973 and 1986 CGL forms. These exclusions apply in the context of a
construction defect claim if the alleged property damage is to the
insured, contractor's property or property in its care, custody or
control.
More specifically, the 1973 CGL form precludes coverage for:
(k) . . . property damage to:
(1) property owned or occupied by or rented to
the insured,
(2) property used by the insured, or
(3) property in the care, custody or control of the
insured or as to which the insured is for any
purpose exercising physical control . . . . [or]
(l) . . . property damage to premises alienated by the named
insured arising out of such premises or any part thereof . . . .
The 1986 policy form contains a modified version of the exclusion
which provides that there is no coverage for property damage to:
(1) Property you own, rent or occupy;
(2) Premises you sell, give away or abandon, if the
"property damage" arises out of any part of those
premises [this paragraph (2) "does not apply if the
premises are 'your work' and were never occupied,
rented or held for rental by you."];
(3) Property loaned to you;
(4) Personal property in your care, custody or control . . . . 76
Significantly, the 1986 exclusion limits the "care, custody or
control" clause to "personal property," meaning that it
only operates to preclude coverage for damage to "personal
property" within the "care, custody or control" of the
insured.77
Where, the insured, contractor owned or leased the damaged property,
the application of this exclusion is quite straight-forward.78 It is
sometimes less clear-cut if the damaged property was in the
"care, custody or control" of the insured so as to trigger
the application of the exclusion. In resolving this issue, courts have
generally considered one or more of the following factors to determine
if the contractor exercised sufficient control over the property to
bring the claim within the scope of the exclusion:
- the role of the contractor in supervising and
protecting the damaged property at issue; 79
- whether the contractor's control was exclusive,
or whether others also had access to the property; 80
- whether the damaged property was merely
incidental to the contractor's work; 81 and
- the amount of time which elapsed between the
contractor's relinquishment of control over the property and the
property damage.82
With respect to the first factor, courts have generally held that the
greater the control exercised by the contractor in supervising and
protecting the damaged property, the greater the likelihood that the
exclusion will apply to preclude coverage.83 Conversely, where the
contractor has not exercised such control over the property at issue,
some courts have concluded that the exclusion does not apply.84
Regarding the second factor - whether the contractor's control was
exclusive - courts often review the language of the underlying
construction contract to determine the degree of control apportioned
to the contractor by contract.85 The greater the degree of control
ceded to the contractor, the greater the likelihood that courts will
find the requisite degree of control necessary for the exclusion to
apply.86
The third factor concerns whether the damaged property was the focus
or subject of the insured's work, or merely incidental thereto. Where
it was the focus or subject of the insured's work, the exclusion is
more likely to apply. Where incidental property is damaged, certain
courts have held that the exclusion does not operate to bar
coverage.87
Finally, as to the fourth factor, certain courts have considered
whether any time elapsed between the cessation of work and the
inception of property damage, such as due to an intervening weekend or
temporary work stoppage.88 Under their reasoning, the shorter the
period of time between work stoppage and property damage, the greater
the likelihood that there was "care, custody or control"
within the meaning of the exclusion.89
IV. CONCLUSION
Differing CGL policy language and differing manners in which courts
have dealt with such language have created a confusing body of
construction defect coverage law. The jurisdiction's law to be applied
may very well make a difference between coverage and no coverage for a
construction defect claim. Once the choice-of-law issue is resolved,
however, the framework for the analysis is rather straight-forward.
Assuming the conditions precedent to coverage have been met, the first
question is whether the construction defect coverage claim falls
within the coverage grant of the CGL policy. If it does, the second
question is whether one or more of the policy exclusions operate to
preclude coverage. In light of the nature of construction defect
coverage claims and the design of the CGL policy, such a claim may
very well fall outside the scope of the CGL coverage or may be
otherwise excluded.
- Centex Homes Corp. v. Prestressed
Systems, Inc., 444 So. 2d 66, 67-68 (Fla. Ct. App. 1984) (citation
omitted).
- The CGL policy was first introduced in
1955 by the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters, which later
merged into Insurance Services Office, Inc. ("ISO"). ISO
revised the so-called "standard" CGL form in 1966, 1973
and 1986. As part of the 1986 revision, the name of the policy was
changed from "comprehensive" to "commercial"
general liability. The 1986 form also incorporated, piecemeal, the
"broad form" endorsement that was offered to supplement
CGL policies issued prior to 1986. This article focuses upon ISO's
1973 and 1986 so-called "standard" policy forms because
they have and continue to be forms that frequently are at issue in
construction defect coverage claim disputes.
- The 1986 CGL form includes the
"accident" requirement in the definition of
"occurrence," but the requirement that the property
damage be neither expected nor intended is included in an
exclusion in the 1986 form.
- The meaning of "loss of use"
as used in the "property damage" definition has also
been litigated. Courts are divided as to whether there must be
"physical injury" before there is coverage for
"loss of use" within the meaning of the 1973 CGL form.
Compare Batson-Cook Co. v. Aetna Insurance Co., 409 S.E.2d 41 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1991) (yes) with Geurin Contractors, Inc. v. Bituminous
Casualty Corp., 5 Ark. App. 229, 636 S.W.2d 638 (Ark. Ct. App.
1982) (no). The 1986 CGL form specifically excludes coverage for:
"Property damage" to "impaired property" or
property that has not been physically injured, arising out of: . .
. (1) [a] defect, deficiency, inadequacy or dangerous condition in
"your product" or "your work;" or . . . (2)
[a] delay or failure by you or anyone acting on your behalf to
perform a contract or agreement in accordance with its terms. This
exclusion does not apply to the loss of use of other property
arising out of sudden and accidental physical injury to "your
product" or "your work" after it has been put to
its intended use.
- See, e.g., Selective Insurance Co. v. J.
B. Mouton & Sons, Inc., 954 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1992); SLA
Property Management v. Angelina Casualty Co., 856 F.2d 69 (8th
Cir. 1988); Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. McIbs, Inc., 684 F.
Supp. 246 (D. Nev. 1988).
- See, e.g., Selective Insurance Co. v. J.
B. Mouton & Sons, Inc., 954 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1992).
- See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine
Insurance Co. v. Coss, 80 Cal. App. 3d 888, 145 Cal. Rptr. 836
(Cal. Ct. App. 1978); Vernon Williams & Son Construction, Inc.
v. Continental Insurance Co., 591 S.W.2d 760 (Tenn. 1979).
- Maryland Casualty Co. v. Reeder, 221
Cal. App. 3d 961, 270 Cal. Rptr. 719, 722-23 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)
(citations omitted).
- Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. McIbs,
Inc., 684 F. Supp. 246, 248-49 (D. Nev. 1988) (citations omitted).
- St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.
v. Coss, 80 Cal. App. 3d 888, 145 Cal. Rptr. 836, 839 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1978); accord Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v.
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co., 861 F.2d 250, 254 (10th Cir.
1988) (diminution in value of building resulting from
incorporation of defective product not property damage); Hamilton
Die Cast, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 508
F.2d 417, 419-20 (7th Cir. 1975) (incorporation of defective
component not property damage where no injury to other parts).
- See, e.g., Stillwell v. Brock Brothers,
Inc., 736 F. Supp. 201, 205 (S.D. Ind. 1990) ("[w]ithout
cluttering this entry with myriad citations, it can be said that
every jurisdiction, with the exception of Louisiana, has held that
the time an accident 'occurs' is the time when the complaining
party is actually injured, not the time when the wrongful act is
committed"); Alan Windt, Insurance Claims & Disputes §
11.04 at 198 (3d ed. 1995) ("the trigger of coverage is
defined to be the date of bodily injury or property damage. The
date of the wrongdoing is irrelevant"); 11 Couch on Insurance
2d § 44.8 at 194 (rev. ed. 1982) ("It appears to be well
settled that the time of the occurrence of an accident within the
meaning of an indemnity policy is not the time the wrongful act
was committed, but when the complaining party was actually
damaged.").
- See, e.g., Boardman Petroleum, Inc. v.
Federated Mutual Insurance Co., 926 F. Supp. 1566, 1577-78 (S.D.
Ga. 1995) (construing Georgia law) (coverage triggered by exposure
to damaging conditions); Continental Insurance Companies v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Company, Inc., 842 F.2d
977, 984 (1988) (applying Missouri law) (exposure trigger
applicable to property damage claims), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 66
(1988).
- See, e.g., Maryland Casualty Co. v. W.R.
Grace & Co., 23 F.3d 617, 625-26 (2d Cir. 1993) (applying New
York law) (extending injury-in-fact trigger to cases involving
underlying claims of property damage resulting from asbestos
contamination), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 655 (1994); Trizec
Properties, Inc. v. Biltmore Construction Co., 767 F.2d 810, 812
(11th Cir. 1985) (applying Florida law) (CGL policy is triggered
when the complaining party's property sustains actual damage
during the policy period); Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Liberty
Mutual Insurance Co., 703 F. Supp. 367, 370 (E.D. Pa. 1989)
(applying Pennsylvania law) (in property damage context, "the
plain language of CGL contract supports only one construction: the
injury-in-fact analysis").
- See, e.g., Mraz v. Canadian Universal
Insurance Co., 804 F.2d 1325, 1328 (4th Cir. 1986) (CGL policy is
triggered when damage is discovered); American Motorists Insurance
Co. v. Levelor Lorentzen, Inc., No. Civ. A. 88-1994, 57 U.S.L.W.
2270, 1988 WL 112142, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 14, 1988) ("'first
discovery' principle" is most appropriate standard), aff'd,
932 F.2d 958 (3d Cir. 1991); Pittsburgh Corning Corp. v. Travelers
Indemnity Co., No. 84-3985 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 21, 1988), clarified,
No. 84-3985 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 1988) (property damage from
asbestos placed in buildings occurred when asbestos hazard was
discovered).
- See, e.g., Chemical Leaman Tank Lines,
Inc. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 89 F.3d 976, 995 (3d Cir.
1996) (applying New Jersey law) (continuous trigger extends to
property damage claims), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 485 (1996);
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Insurance Co., 138 N.J. 437, 650
A.2d 974, 983-93 (N.J. 1994) (continuous trigger applied to both
bodily injury and property damage claims arising out of
manufacture and installation of asbestos); Gruol Construction Co.,
Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 11 Wash. App. 632, 524
P.2d 427, 430 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (continuous trigger applied in
property damage context because damage to structure was
"continuous process which increased with time"), review
denied, 84 Wash. 2d 1014 (Wash. 1974).
- 23 F.3d 617 (2d Cir. 1994).
- 653 So. 2d 1215 (La. Ct. App. 1995),
writ denied, 660 So. 2d 878 (La. 1995).
- In resolving the "occurrence"
issue, some courts have used the so-called "objective"
test. Using such an analysis, coverage is barred if the insured
expected or should have expected property damage based upon the
circumstances. See, e.g., City of Carter Lake v. Aetna Casualty
and Surety Co., 604 F.2d 1052, 1058-59 (8th Cir. 1979) ("the
word 'expected' denotes that the actor knew or should have known
that there was a substantial probability that circumstances will
result from his actions."). Other courts have applied a more
"subjective" test, finding that property damage is
expected if the insured knew the damage was likely to result, but
even such courts have examined objective criteria and have even
presumed that the damage was expected under compelling
circumstances. See, e.g., Broderick Investment Co. v. Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co., 954 F.2d 601, 605-06 (10th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 189 (1992).
- Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Bartlett,
307 Minn. 72, 240 N.W.2d 310 (Minn. 1976), overruled on other
grounds by Prahm v. Rupp Construction Co., 277 N.W.2d 389 (Minn.
1979).
- 240 N.W.2d at 312; accord Johnson v. AID
Insurance Co. of Des Moines, Iowa, 287 N.W.2d 663, 665 (Minn.
1980) ("an insured contractor's willful and knowing
violations of contract specifications and expected standards of
workmanship do not establish an 'occurrence'").
- Indiana Insurance Co. v. Hydra Corp.,
245 Ill. App. 3d 926, 615 N.E.2d 70, 73-75 (Ill. Ct. App. 1993),
appeal denied, 152 Ill. 2d 559, 622 N.E.2d 1206 (Ill. 1993).
- 615 N.E.2d at 73; accord Jakobson
Shipyard, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 961 F.2d 387, 389
(2d Cir. 1992) (faulty workmanship which is not in compliance with
contract specifications is not an "occurrence");
Kruckenberg v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 226 F.2d
225, 226 (9th Cir. 1955) (no accident because damage from blasting
should have been reasonably expected, and "[t]he fact that
the injury is more extensive than had been anticipated does not
suffice to make the damage accidental"); Reliance Insurance
Co. v. Mogavero, 640 F. Supp. 84, 86-87 (D. Md. 1986)
("occurrence does not include the normal, expected
consequences of poor workmanship"); Bennett v. Fidelity &
Casualty Co., 132 So. 2d 788, 790-92 (Fla. Ct. App. 1961) (no
coverage for flooding when contractor put in defective dike
similar to previously installed dike which had caused flooding).
- Closely related to the
"occurrence" issue is the "known loss"
doctrine which is a basic tenet of insurance law that precludes
coverage where the loss is known before the insurance is procured.
See, e.g., Stonewall Insurance Co. v. Asbestos Claims Management
Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1215 (2d Cir. 1995) ("the 'known' loss
defense requires consideration of whether, at the time the insured
bought the policy (or the policy incepted), the loss was
known"); Central Quality Services Corp. v. Insurance Co. of
North America, Nos. 90-1991, 90-2137, 90-2221, 90-2252, 1992 WL
296718, at *2-3 (6th Cir. Oct. 16, 1992) (the "known
loss" doctrine precludes coverage where the insured knew or
should have known that there was a substantial probability of loss
or liability before the insured procured the insurance policy);
Stonewall Insurance Co. v. National Gypsum Co., No. 86 CIV. 9671 (JSM),
1991 WL 320046, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 31, 1991) ("[W]hen the
loss, as distinguished from the risk, becomes known, coverage is
barred."). Accordingly, where the insured knew of the
construction defect loss before it purchased the CGL policy,
coverage is barred under the "known loss" doctrine.
- See, e.g., Southern Guaranty Insurance
Co. v. Zantop International Airlines, Inc., 767 F.2d 795, 799
(11th Cir. 1985).
- See, e.g., Logan's Silo Sales &
Service v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 185 A.D.2d 651,
585 N.Y.S.2d 646, 646 (4th Dep't 1992) (court held that policy's
"completed operations hazard" exclusion applied because
damage occurred away from insured's premises after the completion
of insured's work, thus, insurer had no duty to defend or
indemnify); Rhinebeck Bicycle Shop, Inc. v. Sterling Insurance
Co., 151 A.D.2d 122, 123, 546 N.Y.S.2d 499, 501 (3d Dep't 1989)
(same).
- 404 So. 2d 1311, 1312 (La. Ct. App.
1981).
- Id. at 1313.
- Id. at 1312.
- "Your product" is defined in
the 1986 CGL form as follows:
- Any
goods or products, other than real property, manufactured, sold,
handled, distributed or disposed of by:
- You;
- Others
trading under your name; or
- A
person or organization whose business or assets you have
acquired; and
- Containers
(other than vehicles), materials, parts or equipment furnished
in connection with such goods or products. "Your
product" includes warranties or representations made at any
time with respect to the fitness, quality, durability or
performance of any of the items included in a. and b. above.
"Your product" does not include vending machines or
other property rented to or located for the use of others but
not sold.
- See, e.g., Home Indemnity Co. v. Miller,
399 F.2d 78, 83-84 (8th Cir. 1968) (home built by builder was
"product" within the meaning of the exclusion); American
States Insurance Co. v. Brooks Construction, No. 94-2-03766-2,
14980-3-III, 1997 WL 271501, at *4 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (home was
insured, contractor's "product"); Commerce Insurance Co.
v. Betty Caplette Builders, Inc., 420 Mass. 87, 647 N.E.2d 1211,
1212-14 (Mass. 1995) (homes built by builder were
"products" within the meaning of the exclusion);
Monticello Insurance Co. v. Wil-Freds Construction Co., 277 Ill.
App. 3d 697, 661 N.E.2d 451, 458-60 (Ill. Ct. App. 1996) (building
and parking garage were insured, contractor's
"product"); Zandri Construction Co. v. Fireman's
Insurance Co., 81 A.D.2d 106, 440 N.Y.S.2d 353, 355 (3d Dep't
1981) (church constructed by insured, contractor was
"insured's product"), aff'd sub nom., Zandri
Construction Co. v. Calkins Inc., 54 N.Y.2d 999, 446 N.Y.S.2d 45,
430 N.E.2d 922 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981).
- See, e.g., Stratton & Co. v.
Argonaut Insurance Co., 220 Ga. App. 654, 469 S.E.2d 545, 547-48
(Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (office building was not general contractor's
"product"); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Reeder, 221 Cal.
App. 3d 961, 270 Cal. Rptr. 719, 727-28 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)
(insured's products exclusion not applicable to insured's
condominium project); Owens Pacific Marine, Inc. v. Insurance Co.
of North America, 12 Cal. App. 3d 661, 90 Cal. Rptr. 826, 827-30
(Cal. Ct. App. 1970) (although hot water heater was insured's
"product," boat upon which heater was installed was
not).
- J.G.A. Construction Corp. v. Charter Oak
Fire Insurance Co., 66 A.D.2d 315, 414 N.Y.S.2d 385 (4th Dep't
1979).
- J.G.A. Construction Corp., 414 N.Y.S.2d
at 387-88.
- Id. at 387.
- Maryland Casualty Co. v. Reeder, 221
Cal. App. 3d 961, 270 Cal. Rptr. 719 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
- Reeder, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 728.
- See, e.g., Diamond Heights Homeowners
Association v. National American Insurance Co., 227 Cal. App. 3d
563, 277 Cal. Rptr. 906, 910 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Maryland
Casualty Co. v. Reeder, 221 Cal. App. 3d 961, 270 Cal. Rptr. 719,
722 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
- Basil Development Corp. v. General
Accident Insurance Co., 89 N.Y.2d 1057, 659 N.Y.S.2d 828, 681
N.E.2d 1274 (N.Y. 1997).
- Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 81 N.J.
233, 405 A.2d 788 (N.J. 1979).
- Western Employers Insurance v. Arciero
& Sons, Inc., 146 Cal. App. 3d 1027, 194 Cal. Rptr. 688 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1983).
- Mapes Industries, Inc. v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 252 Neb. 154, 560 N.W.2d 814 (Neb.
1997).
- Basil Development Corp. v. General
Accident Insurance Co., 89 N.Y.2d 1057, 659 N.Y.S.2d 828, 681
N.E.2d 1274, 1275 (N.Y. 1997) (citations omitted). A small
minority of cases have somehow found that an exception in the
contract exclusion of the 1973 CGL policy creates an ambiguity
with respect to the work performed and insured's products
exclusions, making coverage available when a warranty claim is
involved. See, e.g., Fresard v. Michigan Millers Mutual Insurance
Co., 97 Mich. App. 584, 296 N.W.2d 112, 114-15 (Mich. Ct. App.
1980), aff'd, 414 Mich. 686, 327 N.W.2d 286 (Mich. 1982); Custom
Roofing Co. v. Transamerica Insurance Co., 120 Ariz. 196, 584 P.2d
1187, 1188-89 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978). Specifically, the exception
provides that the contract exclusion "does not apply to a
warranty of fitness or quality of the named insured's products or
a warranty that work performed by or on behalf of the named
insured will be done in a workmanlike manner."
- See, e.g., O'Shaughnessy v. Smuckler
Corp., 543 N.W.2d 99, 102-03 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996); Knutson
Construction Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 396
N.W.2d 229, 236-37 (Minn. 1986).
- Western Employers Insurance Co. v.
Arciero & Sons, Inc., 146 Cal. App. 3d 1027, 194 Cal. Rptr.
688, 689 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
- Arciero & Sons, Inc., 194 Cal. Rptr.
at 689-90 (quoting Henderson, Insurance Protection for Products
Liability and Completed Operations - What Every Lawyer Should
Know, 50 Neb. L. Rev. 441 (1971)).
- "Your work" is defined in the
1986 CGL form as follows:
- Work
or operations performed by you or on your behalf; and
- Materials,
parts or equipment furnished in connection with such work or
operations.
- "Your
work" includes warranties or representations made at any
time with respect to the fitness, quality, durability or
performance of any of the items included in a. or b. above.
- The "products-completed operation
hazard" is discussed supra at 9-10.
- Before the 1986 CGL form came into
existence, an insured could purchase the so-called "broad
form" endorsement which similarly deleted the words "on
behalf of" from the work performed exclusion. In Maryland
Casualty Co. v. Reeder, 221 Cal. App. 3d 961, 270 Cal. Rptr. 719,
726 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990), the court held that the elimination of
such language provided "coverage for damage claims [against
general contractor] growing out of services provided by
subcontractors retained during development of the condominium
project." 221 Cal. App. 3d at 974. But see Knutson
Construction Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 396
N.W.2d 229, 237 (Minn. 1986).
- While subparagraph "6" of the
faulty workmanship exclusions does not apply to property damage
included in the "products-completed operations hazard,"
as previously discussed, the work performed exclusion in the 1986
policy specifically precludes coverage for property damage to the
insured, contractor's work "arising out of it or any part of
it" so long as it is included in the "products-completed
operations hazard." However, unlike subparagraph
"6," the 1986 work performed exclusion does not apply to
the work of the insured's subcontractor. See supra at 14.
- Houston Building Service, Inc. v.
American General Fire and Casualty Co., 799 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1990).
- Id. at 311.
- Id. at 310.
- Id. 54 Economy Lumber of Oakland, Inc.
v. Insurance Company of North America, 157 Cal. App. 3d 641, 204
Cal. Rptr. 135 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
- Economy Lumber of Oakland, Inc., 204
Cal. Rptr. at 140.
- Id. at 140-41.
- The 1986 CGL form adds yet another
exclusion with potential applicability to construction defect
claims, which is known as the "impaired property"
exclusion. As explained by one commentator, the impaired property
exclusion targets and precludes coverage for "diminution in
value claims arising from the incorporation of defective
workmanship or products into structures," in response to
"cases finding coverage where a defective product is
incorporated into a structure and no physical damage occurs to the
structure." Owen J. Shean & Douglas L. Patin,
Construction Insurance: Coverages and Disputes § 6-7(c), at 163,
168-69 (1994) (citing Hendrick & Weizel, The New Commercial
General Liability Forms - An Introduction and Critique, Fd'n Ins.
& Corp. Couns. Q. 342, 361-62, 364-68 (Summer 1986)). More
specifically, the impaired property exclusion precludes coverage
for property damage to "'impaired property' or property that
has not been physically injured, arising out of: (1) [a] defect,
deficiency, inadequacy or dangerous condition in 'your product' or
'your work;' or (2) [a] delay or failure by you or anyone acting
on your behalf to perform a contract or agreement in accordance
with its terms." In turn, "impaired property" is
defined as "tangible property other than 'your product' or
'your work,' that cannot be used or is less useful because: a. [i]t
incorporates 'your product' or 'your work' that is known or
thought to be defective, deficient, inadequate or dangerous; or b.
[y]ou have failed to fulfill the terms of a contract or
agreement." But, pursuant to the definition, it is not
"impaired property" unless "such property can be
restored to use by: a. [t]he repair, replacement, adjustment or
removal of 'your product' or 'your work;' or b. [y]our fulfilling
the terms of the contract or agreement." The "impaired
property" exclusion does contain an exception, i.e., it
"does not apply to the loss of use of other property arising
out of sudden and accidental physical injury to 'your product' or
'your work' after it has been put to its intended use."
- The 1973 CGL form defined
"incidental" contract as "any written (1) lease of
premises, (2) easement agreement, except in connection with
construction or demolition operations on or adjacent to a
railroad, (3) undertaking to indemnify a municipality required by
municipal ordinance, except in connection with work for the
municipality, (4) sidetrack agreement, or (5) elevator maintenance
agreement."
- Dreis & Krump Manufacturing Co. v.
Phoenix Insurance Co., 548 F.2d 681, 684 (7th Cir. 1977); Howard
v. Vulcan Materials Co., 533 F.2d 302, 302-03 (5th Cir. 1976).
- The 1973 "broad form"
endorsement, with certain limitations set forth in the endorsement
itself, "extended" the definition of "incidental
contract" found in the 1973 CGL form to include "any
contract or agreement relating to the conduct of the named
insured's business." The 1981 version of the endorsement
added the words "oral or written" to the definition of
"incidental contract."
- "Insured contract" is defined
in the 1986 form as also including the following: "a. [a]
lease of premises; b. [a] sidetrack agreement; c. [a]n easement or
license agreement in connection with vehicle or pedestrian private
railroad crossings at grade; d. [a]ny other easement agreement,
except in connection with construction or demolition operations on
or within 50 feet of a railroad; e. [a]n indemnification of a
municipality as required by ordinance, except in connection with
work for a municipality; [or] f. [a]n elevator maintenance
agreement." Moreover, the definition of "insured
contract" contains the following exception: An "insured
contract" does not include that part of any contract or
agreement:
- That
indemnifies an architect, engineer or surveyor for injury or
damage arising out of:
- Preparing,
approving or failing to prepare or approve maps, drawings,
opinions, reports, surveys, change orders, designs or
specifications; or
- Giving
directions or instructions, or failing to give them, if that
is the primary cause of the injury or damage;
- b.
Under which the insured, if an architect, engineer or surveyor,
assumes liability for injury or damage arising out of the
insured's rendering or failing to render professional services,
including those listed in a. above and supervisory, inspection
or engineering services; or
- c.
That indemnifies any person or organization for damage by fire
to premises rented or loaned to you.
- See, e.g., Bernstein v. Consolidated
American Insurance Co., 37 Cal. App. 4th 763, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 817
(Cal. Ct. App. 1995); Insurance Company of the West v. Haralambos
Beverage Co., 195 Cal. App. 3d 1308, 241 Cal. Rptr. 427 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1987); Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. City of Turlock, 170
Cal. App. 3d 988, 216 Cal. Rptr. 796 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
- See, e.g., City of Turlock, 216 Cal.
Rptr. at 800.
- 37 Cal. App. 4th 763, 43 Cal. Rptr. 817
(Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
- Bernstein, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 822.
- Id.
- Id.
- Id.
- See, e.g., Stonewall Insurance Co. v.
Asbestos Claims Management Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1211 (2d Cir.
1995) (construing New York law); Forest City Dillon, Inc. v. Aetna
Casualty and Surety Co., 852 F.2d 168, 173-74 (6th Cir. 1988)
(construing Pennsylvania law); Dayton Independent School District
v. National Gypsum Co., 682 F. Supp. 1403, 1412-13 (E.D. Tex.
1988) (construing Texas law), rev'd sub nom. on other grounds,
W.R. Grace & Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 896 F.2d 865
(5th Cir. 1990); Arcos Corp. v. American Mutual Liability
Insurance Co., 350 F. Supp. 380, 384-85 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (applying
Pennsylvania law), aff'd, 485 F.2d 678 (3d Cir. 1973); Aetna
Casualty and Surety Co. v. M & S Industries, Inc., 64 Wash.
App. 916, 827 P.2d 321, 326-27 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992); Truax &
Hovey, Ltd. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 122 A.D.2d 563, 504
N.Y.S.2d 934, 934-35 (4th Dep't 1986). But see, e.g., Commercial
Union Assurance Co. v. Glass Lined Pipe Co., 372 So. 2d 1305,
1308-09 (Ala. 1979).
- See, e.g., Dayton Independent School
District v. National Gypsum Co., 682 F. Supp. 1403, 1412 (E.D.
Tex. 1988) (construing Texas law), rev'd sub nom. on other
grounds, W.R. Grace & Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 896
F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1990); Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. M &
S Industries, Inc., 64 Wash. App. 916, 827 P.2d 321, 327 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1992). But see, e.g., Commercial Union Assurance Co. v.
Glass Lined Pipe Co., 372 So. 2d 1305, 1307-09 (Ala. 1979).
- See, e.g., Forest City Dillon, Inc. v.
Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 852 F.2d 168, 173-74 (6th Cir.
1988) (construing Pennsylvania law); Dayton Independent School
District v. National Gypsum Co., 682 F. Supp. 1403, 1412-13 (E.D.
Tex. 1988) (construing Texas law). But see Aetna Insurance Co. v.
Pete Wilson Roofing & Heating Co., 289 Ala. 719, 272 So. 2d
232, 235 (Ala. 1972).
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